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FUNDAMENTAL ENTERPRISE INCOME TAX REFORM 






On 16 March 2007, the National People's Congress of China promulgated 
a new Enterprise Income Tax Law1 (EIT Law) to take effect on 1 January 
2008. It is the first law in Chinese history that imposes an income tax on 
all forms of enterprise. It replaces the current FIE Income Tax Law2 
applicable to enterprises with foreign direct investment and the Interim 
Enterprise Income Tax Regulations3 (Interim EIT Regulations) applicable 
to Chinese-owned enterprises. Most notably, the EIT Law abolishes the 
tax incentives applicable only to foreign-investment enterprises (FIEs) and 
introduces a general tax rate that is internationally competitive. The 
promulgation of the EIT Law symbolizes the maturity of China's tax 
                                                 
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada; and Senior Fellow, 
Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, Monash University, Australia. I thank He 
Huang for her excellent research assistance and David Piccolo for his comments on the 
draft of this article. Email: jinyanli@osgoode.yorku.ca 
     1 Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, promulgated by 
the 5th Session of the Tenth National People's Congress, 16 March 2007 (hereafter "EIT 
Law"). The Chinese text of the law is available at the State Administration of Taxation 
web site: www.chinatax.gov.cn. An unofficial English translation is available at 
www.kpmg.com.cn and www.lehmanlaw.com. 
     2 Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Investment 
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises, Chairman Order [1991], No. 45 (hereafter "FIE 
Income Tax Law"). The Chinese text is available at the State Administration of Taxation 
web site, supra note 1. 
     3 Interim Regulations on Enterprise Income Tax, State Council Order [1993], No. 
137 (hereafter "Interim EIT Regulations"). This was a consolidation of the Interim State-
Owned Enterprise Income Tax (18 September 1984), State-Owned Enterprise Income 
Regulatory Tax (18 September 1984), Interim Collective Enterprise Income Tax (11 
April 1985), and Interim Private Enterprise Income Tax (25 June 1988), all introduced by 
the State Council. 
  
2                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 06 
 
policy, China's commitment to the principles of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and China's confidence in its economic development 
policy. 
 
This article provides some background on this fundamental tax reform and 
an overview of the key changes and their implications. Part 2 briefly 
discusses the evolution of the current tax system, and Part 3 examines the 
motivations behind the promulgation of the EIT Law. The major changes 
in the tax rules and policies are discussed in Part 4. Part 5 concludes the 
article with some comments on the preliminary impact of the reform. 
 
II. THE CURRENT TAX SYSTEM 
A. THE DUAL-TRACK SYSTEM 
 
The current enterprise income tax system came into existence in the early 
1980s.4 At that time, China was trying to "get across the river [from a 
command economy to a market-based economy] by feeling the stones on 
the river bed" (mozhe shitou guohe). There was no bridge or precedence to 
guide China's economic transition. China had never had an income tax5 or 
a legal tradition familiar to foreign investors.6 The previous Maoist regime 
                                                 
     4 See note 3, supra, for the introduction of some taxes. The Chinese-Foreign 
Equity Joint Venture Income Tax (EJVIT) Law was promulgated in 1980; the Income 
Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises was 
promulgated in 1981 (hereafter "FEIT" or "FEIT Law"). 
     5 When the modern income tax was introduced in the United States (1913) and 
Canada (1917), China was undergoing civil wars and political turmoil, which ended when 
the Communist Party declared the establishment of the People's Republic on 1 October 
1949. After 1949, foreign capital left China, and domestic private capital was confiscated. 
Capitalism and markets were incompatible with the Communist Party-led socialism. The 
absence of international investment and business transactions eliminated any need for 
international taxation. When foreign investors were allowed back into China in the late 
1970s, it was considered appropriate to impose an income tax on them. 
     6 For more discussion on Chinese legal traditions, see Peerenboom, Randall, 
China's Long March toward Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002); Lubman, Stanley B., Bird in a Cage -- Legal Reform in China after Mao 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press (1999); Lubman, Stanley B., "Looking for 
Law in China", 20 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1 (2006); Hsu, Stephen C. (ed.), 




left behind institutions that could not adequately support a legal system 
appropriate for a market-driven economy. The government under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping adopted a pragmatic, evolutionary approach 
to reform.7 Foreign direct investment (FDI) was to be encouraged, but kept 
separate from the domestic sector and subject to different regulatory 
regimes. In terms of taxation, the income of enterprises receiving FDI and 
FIEs (including equity joint ventures (EJVs), contractual joint ventures, 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, and joint-stock companies with foreign 
shareholders) was taxed differently from the income derived by Chinese-
owned enterprises.8 
 
B. PREFERENTIAL TAX REGIME FOR FDI 
 
The income taxes imposed by the FIE Income Tax Law (1991) and its 
predecessors (the EJVIT and FEIT Laws)9 are similar to the income taxes 
in Western countries. A main policy objective of these taxes is to attract 
FDI. This was accomplished by following the international tax norms, 
adopting low tax rates, and offering generous tax incentives. China's 
                                                                                                                         
Understanding China's legal system: essays in honor of Jerome A. Cohen (New York: 
New York University Press, 2003); and Ren, Xin, Tradition of the Law and Law of the 
Tradition (1997). 
     7 More importantly, the Communist Party was not interested in reforming the 
political system while embarking on economic reforms. How could market capitalism 
coexist with a Communist-led "people's democratic dictatorship"? There were, of course, 
no readily available answers to any of these questions. The Chinese leadership has 
resisted the advice of international experts to go for "big bang" economic reforms in 
favour of a more gradual, pragmatic approach. For more discussion, see Peerenboom, 
Randall, "What Have We Learned about Law and Development? Describing, Predicting, 
and Assessing Legal Reforms in China", 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 823  
(2006); and Peerenboom, supra note 6, at 197.  
     8 For an overview of the evolution of China's tax system, see Brean, Don (ed.), 
Taxation in Modern China (New York and London: Routledge, 1998); Easson, Alex and 
Jinyan Li, Taxation of Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China (The Hague: 
Kluwer, 1989); Fulton, T., Daniel Xu and Jinyan Li (eds.), China's Tax Reform Options 
(New York: World Scientific, 1998); Li, Jinyan, Taxation in the People's Republic of 
China (New York: Praeger, 1991); and Moser, Michael and Winston Zee, China Tax 
Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
     9 FIE Income Tax Law, supra note 2; EJVIT Law and FEIT Law, supra note 4.   
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extensive treaty network covers these taxes and preserves China's tax 
incentives, mostly through a tax sparing credit in China's treaties with 
capital-exporting countries (with the notable exception of the United 
States). 
 
International experience and tax norms were among the "stepping stones" 
used by Chinese officials in the early 1980s. The text of the basic tax 
legislation of selected developed countries (notably the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Japan) and developing countries (Brazil, Mexico and 
Singapore) as well as the OECD Model Tax Convention and the UN 
Model Convention was translated into Chinese. International tax experts 
provided crash courses on the fundamental international tax principles. 
Some Chinese officials were sent to study abroad. To the extent possible, 
the EJVIT Law adopted international tax concepts and principles, 
including the principle of worldwide taxation and the prevention of double 
taxation through a foreign tax credit. 
 
The lack of a legal tradition familiar to Western investors and the absence 
of administrative experience with a modern tax law meant that the new 
income tax law had to provide sufficient "certainty" and legal assurances 
to foreign investors while being administratively feasible. The form of the 
legislation is "fa" or "law".10 In China's legislative hierarchy, it is the 
highest form of legislation and must be passed by the legislature -- the 
National People's Congress. The appearance of "the rule of law" was used 
only in the tax legislation applicable to foreign investors. Meanwhile, the 
EJVIT Law was a model of legislative simplicity. The whole text 
consisted of fewer than 1,000 Chinese characters and 18 articles.11 
Consistent with Chinese legal tradition, great powers were given to the tax 
administration. For example, the eligibility to receive most tax incentives 
required the pre-approval of the tax authorities. 
                                                 
     10 "Law" is a statute enacted by the National People's Congress. China deemed it 
important to subject foreign investors to tax "laws", not just "interim regulations" or 
"administrative rules", in order to convey a sense of "the rule of law" to foreign investors. 
     11 Arts. 1 to 7 set forth the rules for tax jurisdiction, determination of the tax base, 
the tax rate and tax incentives. Art. 16 provided the foreign tax credit as the method of 
relieving international double taxation. The remaining ten articles were devoted to 
administrative matters, such as filing returns, the tax authorities' powers of investigation, 
dispute resolution and tax penalties. 





It was also clear at the beginning that tax policy would be used to attract 
FDI. Initially, foreign businessmen advised China to offer tax incentives 
for FDI.12 Chinese officials were aware of the tax incentives being offered 
by Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and other 
countries.13 They were advised that some international experts questioned 
the efficiency and effectiveness of tax incentives,14 but remained 
concerned that China would be unable to compete for FDI unless it offered 
tax incentives similar to those provided elsewhere.15 The EJVIT Law 
therefore granted tax incentives in the form of tax holidays and a 
reinvestment tax refund.16 Similar incentives were available under the 
FEIT Law. However, because China was not very enthusiastic about 
foreign companies operating in China without a local equity partner 
(typically a state-owned enterprise), the incentives under the FEIT Law 
were less generous.17 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a huge boom in establishing 
                                                 
     12 See Pomp, Richard and Stanley Surrey, "The Tax Structure of the People's 
Republic of China", 20 Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (1979), at 12. 
     13 See Liu, Longheng, Introduction to Chinese Tax Law (Beijing University Press, 
1986), at 240 (in Chinese). 
     14 Pomp and Surrey, supra note 12, at 12. 
     15 Id.   
     16 The standard tax holiday was three years (a one-year exemption and two years 
of a half reduction), starting in the first profit-making year. An extended holiday of ten 
years was available to EJVs engaged in low-profit operations in farming and forestry or 
located in remote, economically underdeveloped areas. Forty per cent of the income tax 
paid on the amount of profit reinvested in China would be refunded. Obtaining any of the 
tax preferences depended on the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance. The EJVIT 
Law formally incorporated the tax incentives previously promised in the EJV Law. The 
EJV Law provided that the income tax (which was not yet in existence) payable by 
Chinese-foreign EJVs was to be reduced or waived if the foreign investors brought "up-
to-date" technology to the joint venture or if the profit made in China was reinvested in 
China.   
     17 For example, a three-year tax holiday was available only if the investment was 
scheduled to operate for at least ten years in farming, forestry, animal husbandry or other 
low-profit operations. Upon approval by the Ministry of Finance, an additional tax 
reduction of 15% to 30% was available. Chinese-source investment income, including 
interest, rents and royalties, was subject to a 20% withholding tax.   
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special preferential tax regimes for FDI. A major aspect of China's FDI 
policy was development region by region. The strategy was to concentrate 
limited resources for improving the infrastructure in small geographic 
areas. Another aspect of the policy was to encourage export, which could 
not only earn foreign currency, but also keep FDI separate from the 
domestic market. 
 
Four "special economic zones" (SEZs) were created in 1980 along the 
south coast: Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province (and 
close to Hong Kong) and Xiamen in Fujian Province (across from 
Taiwan).18 They were created to attract investors in general and investors 
from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan in particular. The State Council 
introduced temporary rules to grant special tax reductions and exemptions 
in the SEZs.19 These tax preferences applied to all forms of FDI and were 
more generous than those under the existing EJVIT and FEIT Laws. For 
example, the general tax rate was 15% (as opposed to 30%); the local tax 
was waived; the tax holiday was longer (five years instead of three) for 
"productive" enterprises (those engaged in manufacturing, 
communications and transport, agriculture, forestry, or animal husbandry); 
the refund for reinvestment was 100% (as opposed to 40%); and the 10% 
withholding tax on dividends (or profit distributions) was waived. Most 
significantly, the SEZs set precedents for the authorities to establish 
preferences which help channel foreign capital and technology to other 
designated priority areas. 
 
Fourteen "coastal economic open cities" were designated in 1984, and 
certain areas in them were designated as "economic and technological 
development areas" and others as "old urban districts".20 The tax 
                                                 
     18 For more discussion on the SEZs, see Crane, George, The Political Economy of 
China's Special Economic Zones (1990); and Bucknall, Kevin B., China and the Open 
Door Policy (1989), at 143-167.  
     19 See Provisional Regulations of the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China Regarding the Reduction of and Exemption from Enterprise Income Tax and 
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in the Special Economic Zones and the 
Fourteen Coastal Cities, promulgated by the State Council on 15 November 1984. 
     20  The 14 coastal cities were Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Yantai, 
Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and 
Beihai. The list of "coastal economic open regions" was later expanded to cover over 170 
cities and counties in eight provinces. 




incentives in the economic and technological development areas were very 
close to those in the SEZs, but the incentives in the coastal economic open 
cities were less generous.21 Many "coastal economic open regions", 
consisting of urban and rural areas in the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas, 
and the South Fujian region, were designated in 1985.22 
 
In addition to special regions, special FDI projects or activities received 
preferential tax treatment. The two most well-known types of projects 
were export-oriented23 and technologically advanced.24 On top of any tax 
exemption and reduction to which a taxpayer was entitled, the tax rate was 
reduced to 15% in general and 10% in the SEZs.25 For technologically 
advanced enterprises, the tax rate was reduced by half for three years 
following the standard tax holiday. Reinvestment in either type of 
enterprise was eligible for a full refund of the tax paid on the reinvested 
profit. Other preferred investments included infrastructure projects,26 
"productive" activities, agriculture and animal husbandry. Services and 
passive investments were not encouraged. 
                                                 
     21 See Jiang, Zhaodong, "China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, 
Culture and Modern Concepts", 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business 549 (1998), at 611. For example, a reduced 15% tax rate applied to EJVs, 
contractual joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in the old urban districts 
which were technology or know-how intensive and had an investment exceeding USD 30 
million and a long investment recovery period or if the projects related to energy, 
transport or port construction.  
     22 See Jiang, id. 
     23 "Export-oriented enterprises" were enterprises that produced goods mainly (over 
70%) for export and maintained a net positive foreign exchange balance at the end of the 
year. 
     24 "Technologically advanced enterprises" were enterprises which, with advanced 
technology provided by foreign investors, were able to develop new products or upgrade 
existing ones and therefore earn foreign exchange through exports or import substitution. 
     25 The tax rate was reduced to 10% for FIEs in the economic and technology 
development areas or other areas where the enterprise income tax rate was already 15%. 
     26 Irrespective of the location of the investment, the tax rate was reduced to 15% 
for EJVs in port and berth construction projects. New projects scheduled to operate for 15 
years or more were eligible for a ten-year tax holiday (a five-year exemption followed by 
a five-year 50% reduction in tax). The tax holiday might be extended upon approval by 
the Ministry of Finance. The withholding tax on profit distributions was waived as was 
the local income tax. See Jiang, supra note 21.  
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The formal tax discrimination between EJVs and other forms of FDI 
seemed to make little sense by the end of the 1980s. By then, the majority 
of FDI was either located in special areas or involved in preferred 
investment projects, thus receiving similar tax preferences whether or not 
the form was an EJV. In 1991, the EJVIT and FEIT Laws were 
consolidated into the FIE Income Tax Law,27 but the existing tax 
incentives were preserved. After 1991, new tax incentives continued to be 
granted. The Pudong New District was created in the city of Shanghai28 in 
order to develop Shanghai into a world-class financial centre. Other 
"special" regions included western regions, north-east regions, border 
cities, bonded zones, tourist and resort areas, and "high and new 
technology industrial development areas".29 The rise of special areas away 
from the coastal regions effectively made the special tax regimes in the 
coastal regions less special. The coastal regions therefore created new 
types of special zones to remain competitive, including bonded zones, free 
trade zones, high and new industrial development zones, Taiwan 
investment zones, the Singapore-Suzhou industrial park, and tourist and 
resort zones.30 
 
C. TAXATION OF DOMESTICALLY-FUNDED ENTERPRISES 
 
State-owned enterprises, collective enterprises and private enterprises are 
currently taxed under different regulations, which were originally 
introduced in 1984 and subsequently (in 1993) consolidated into the 
                                                 
     27 See notes 2 and 4, supra. For an overview of the tax implications for foreign 
investors, see Curley, Stephen and Darren Fortunato, "Tax Considerations for Investors in 
China: A Preliminary Look", 20 North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commerce Regulation 531 (1995); Li, Jinyan, "Tax Implications of Doing Business in 
China", 43 Canadian Tax Journal 75 (1995); Li, Jinyan, "Taxation of Foreign Business 
and Investment in the People's Republic of China", 7 International Business and Tax 
Lawyer 120 (1989); and Lin, Kenny, "Income Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in 
China", 25 International Tax Journal 78 (1999). 
     28 See Jiang, supra note 21, at 580-589. 
     29 Id. 
     30 Id. 




Interim EIT Regulations.31 Although the Interim EIT Regulations and the 
FIE Income Tax Law have the same statutory rate of 33%, the effective 
tax rate for FIEs is about 10 percentage points lower because of the tax 
incentives discussed above and the limitations on deductions in the Interim 
EIT Regulations. For example, while the FIE Income Tax Law allows a 
full deduction for the interest expenses incurred for income-producing 
purposes, the Interim EIT Regulations limit the deduction to the interest 
charged at the rate set by government-owned financial institutions. As 
such, many enterprises cannot deduct the full interest expenses because 
they had to borrow from non-state-owned banks that charged a higher 
interest rate. Similarly, wages and salaries are not deductible under the 
Interim EIT Regulations if the amount exceeds the standard amount 
specified by the government. With the liberalization of the labour market, 
the government-specified wage standard is much lower than the wages 
paid by enterprises, especially non-state-owned enterprises. This means 
that the excessive cost is not tax deductible. 
 
So long as the foreign-funded firms did not compete with Chinese firms, 
the most effective way of using the tax system to attract FDI was to give 
tax incentives only to foreign investors.32 By the turn of the century, 
especially after China's accession to the WTO in 2001, the FDI tax policy 
was under close scrutiny and heatedly debated. When local firms began to 
suffer from the preferential treatment given to foreigners, China switched 
to a universally low corporate tax rate of 25%. 
 
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR TAX REFORM 
 
In explaining the draft law to the National People's Congress, the Minister 
of Finance identified the following as the guiding principles for the new 
law:33 
                                                 
     31 See note 3, supra.   
     32 As discussed below, such differential policy resulted in round-tripping. 
However, round-tripping was presumably not considered a serious problem because 
China did not make it very difficult for those engaged in round-tripping. The alternative 
would have been to grant tax incentives to all taxpayers, which would be costly in terms 
of revenue. 
     33 Jin, Renqing, Minister of Finance, "Explanation on Draft Enterprise Income Tax 
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-equal taxation of all enterprises; 
-the promotion of overall, sustainable development of China's 
economy; 
-reference to the international tax norms and practices; and 
-efficiency in tax administration and simplicity in compliance. 
 
A. EQUAL/NEUTRAL TAXATION 
 
The hallmark of the new EIT Law is equal taxation of all enterprises, 
irrespective of the source of capital. Foreign-funded and domestically-
funded enterprises are taxable under the same rules. The tax preferences 
that were available only to FIEs are now abolished or are to be phased out 
in five years. As discussed in more detail below, this shift in tax policy 
indicates China's confidence in attracting FDI without tax incentives. 
 
China initially introduced the FDI tax incentives in part to compensate 
investors for the lack of market or investment conditions. During the early 
years of the reform, these incentives played a positive role in attracting 
investment, which in turn promoted the development of a market 
mechanism in China and propelled economic growth. However, the 
differential tax policy was difficult to maintain when FIEs were allowed 
greater access to the Chinese internal market, especially after China's 
accession to the WTO in 2001. Foreign firms have gradually been allowed 
to own up to 50% of enterprises in sensitive industries, such as telecoms, 
banking and insurance. Multinational companies have taken over Chinese 
companies in a quest for economies of scale. The FDI tax incentives have 
aided such foreign takeovers. In 2006, foreign investors controlled the 
majority of assets in 21 out of 28 major industrial sectors.34 Given the 
large amount of FDI in China, domestically-funded companies are facing 
tax discrimination in addition to the challenges resulting from the control 
and market power of multinational firms on the Chinese market. The 
potential dominance of key economic sectors by multinational firms, 
                                                                                                                         
Law". The full text of the speech in English is available at www.china- 
embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t302221.htm (visited on 31 July 2007). 
     34 Shi, Weigan, "A Reexamination of the Role of Foreign Investors", 1 September 
2006, available at finance.sina.com.cn (in Chinese). 




assisted by the tax system, became a serious concern.35 Chinese-owned 
enterprises cried for "national treatment" from their own government. The 
Minister of Finance, Jin Renqing, acknowledged this in his explanation of 
the draft law to the National People's Congress:36 
 
Great changes have taken place in China's economy and 
society, and the socialist market economy has initially 
taken shape. With China's accession to the WTO, the 
Chinese domestic market has been further open to foreign 
capital; domestic enterprises have gradually integrated 
themselves into the world economy and are facing ever-
increasing competition. If different tax policies continued 
to be implemented for domestic and foreign-funded 
enterprises, the former would definitely be put at a 
competitive disadvantage and the establishment of a unified 
market with standardized and fair competition would be 
obstructed. 
 
B. PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
The EIT Law represents a fundamental change in China's tax policy -- 
from the preferential taxation of FDI to the neutral taxation of all 
enterprises. It also reflects a fundamental shift in China's economic 
development strategy -- from a focus on FDI-led manufacturing and 
export to a focus on technology and sustainable economic development.37 
The FDI preferential tax policy was geared to promote the former model 
of development and regional development, and its effectiveness and 
efficiency has become questionable in recent years. 
 
                                                 
     35 See Fung, Hung-Gay, Julius Johnson, Jr. and Yanda Xu, "Winners and Losers: 
Foreign Firms in China's Emerging Market", 37 The Chinese Economy 5 (No. 3, 2004). 
     36 Jin, supra note 33. 
     37 For an overview of this policy shift, see Whalley, John and Weimin Zhou, 
"Technology Upgrading and China's Growth Strategy to 2020", Centre for International 
Governance and Innovation (CIGI) (March 2007), available at 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982232. 
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There is no denial that FDI has been considered to be the "engine" of 
China's rapid economic growth: FIEs contributed about 0.4% to China's 
annual GDP growth during the 1990s,38 helped China build a highly 
competitive and dynamic manufacturing sector for exports,39 and affected 
China's economic growth through the diffusion of ideas and transfer of 
technology.40 However, the extent to which FDI was attracted to China 
because of its tax incentives or whether the incentives were economically 
efficient is unclear. 
 
Scholars who argue that the tax incentives were effective in attracting FDI 
to China41 often refer to the general data on the FDI growth in China42 and 
the fact that over 80% was located in the tax-preferred coastal areas.43 
                                                 
     38 Tseng, Wanda and Harm Zebregs, "Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some 
Lessons for Other Countries", IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/02/03.   
     39 Zhang Tao, "Utilization of Foreign Capital and Economic Growth in China", 37 
The Chinese Economy 62 (No. 1, 2004). 
     40 See Dees, Stephane, "Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and 
Effects", 31 Economics of Planning 175 (1998) 
     41 See e.g. Li, Gang and Guangyi Chen, "Direction of Chinese International Tax 
Law under WTO Principles", in Liu, Jianwen (ed.), 8 Finance and Tax Law Review 281 
(2006), at 298 (Beijing: Law Press China, 2006) (in Chinese); Cheng, Leonard K. and 
Yum K. Kwan, "What are the Determinants of the Location of Foreign Direct 
Investment? The Chinese Experience", 20 Journal of International Economics 375 
(2000); and Tung, Samuel and Stella Cho, "The Impact of Tax Incentives on Foreign 
Direct Investment in China", 9 Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation 
105 (No. 2, 2000). 
     42 The annual value of FDI actually utilized in China is as follows: USD 4.1 billion 
in 1979-1984, USD 1.9 billion in 1985, USD 34.8 billion in 1990, USD 37.5 billion in 
1995, USD 40.7 billion in 2000, and USD 60.3 billion in 2005. Source: China Statistical 
Yearbook (2006), available at www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/html/R1814E.xls (visited 
on 10 July 2007).  
     43 Jiang, Xiaojuan, Yingxin Wang and Laike Yang, "A Study of the Gradual Shift 
of Foreign Investment", 37 The Chinese Economy 19 (No. 5, 2004); Chen, Chun, 
"Reflections on the Matter of Foreign Tax Preferences", [2005] International Taxation in 
China, No. 7 at 31 (in Chinese). On the other hand, there are obvious non-tax factors that 
are attractive to FDI: the special areas on the east coast generally have a longer history of 
openess to investors; better infrastructure; a more open, transparent and efficient local 
government; a better educated workforce; and higher purchasing power. Hon, Tai-Yuen, 
Che-Cheong Poon and Kai-Yin Woo, "Regional Distribution of Foreign Direct 
Investment in China: A Multivariate Data Analysis of Major Socioeconomic Variables", 




Using the FDI growth as a basis for asserting the effectiveness of tax 
incentives is unreliable as it fails to identify the amount of FDI inflow that 
would not have occurred in the absence of the tax incentives. More weight 
may have been given to the tax incentives as an influencing factor. The 
apparent correlation between the location of FDI in China's coastal areas 
and the location-specific tax incentives is misleading as evidence of the 
effectiveness of tax incentives because the general investment 
environment in the coastal areas has been more conducive to investment 
than the rest of China. Since most exports are competitive in labour costs 
and there is little regulation regarding pollution, labour protection, health, 
and safety controls, it is possible that labour-intensive, export-oriented 
investment would have taken place anyway. 
 
Historically, tax incentives have played a positive role in attracting FDI. 
Granting tax incentives sent a clear signal of China's desire for investment 
by foreigners. This signalling effect was historically important because 
China suffered from serious image problems due to its previous hostile 
policies towards foreign investors. The choice of the very word in the 
Chinese language, "you hui" (preferences) for tax incentives conveyed a 
positive message.44 Tax preferences were presented by China as gifts or 
rewards to overseas investors. 
 
Tax incentives appear to have been effective in attracting overseas 
Chinese investors and investors looking for a low-cost manufacturing 
base. Once the tax incentive regime was firmly in place, it became a 
constant factor and had much less influence. For example, following 
China's accession to the WTO, the fate of the FDI tax incentives was 
publicly debated in China,45 but in spite of their uncertainty and possible 
                                                                                                                         
38 The Chinese Economy 56 (No. 2, 2005) (a fundamental determinant of regional 
disparity in FDI in China in 1998–2003 was the overall socioeconomic environment in 
the administrative regions). 
     44 Jiang, supra note 21, at 611. 
     45 See Guo, Hong, "Principles and Directions of China's Foreign Tax Incentives", 
[2005] Taxation Research Journal, No. 11 at 14 (in Chinese); Ma, Guoqiang, "Current 
Chinese Tax Incentives: Problems and Suggestions", [2003] Taxation Research Journal, 
No. 3 at 34 (in Chinese); and Liang, Jiang, "Problems with China's Current Tax 
Incentives for Science and Technology", [2001] Taxation Research Journal, No. 10 at 35 
(in Chinese). 
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elimination, FDI continued to increase in China. Investors who are lured to 
China by its domestic market, such as retail, telecoms, banking, services 
and certain consumer products, are less affected by tax incentives. Large 
multinational enterprises are found to be less influenced by China's tax 
incentives than small and medium-size firms.46 Presumably, multinationals 
are more interested in the long-term investment environment than the 
short-term effect of tax incentives. They can use tax planning techniques 
to achieve an effective tax rate target that is much lower than the formal 
tax rate. 
 
Meanwhile, generous tax incentives have caused "round-tripping" in 
China.47 Chinese investors, who would otherwise pay tax at least 10 
percentage points higher than FIEs, have been motivated to set up entities 
in tax havens to channel their investment in China. The People's Daily48 
reported: 
 
The British Virgin Islands is a major destination for China's 
offshore investment. ... 10,000 out of 500,000 companies there are 
from China. Most China-originated money entering tax havens will 
re-enter China as "foreign investment" – "round-tripping". ... A 
closer examination of China's star foreign direct investment (FDI) 
                                                 
     46 Shan, Wenhua, "Law and Foreign Investment in China: General Role of Law 
and Substantive Issues (part one)", 2 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 
41 (2005); Zhang, Yang and Hui Liu, "Analysis of the Impact of Taxation on FDI", 
[2006] Taxation Research Journal, No. 4 at 39, 41 (in Chinese). Shan also reached this 
conclusion in his empirical study; he noted that tax incentives were regarded as an 
important factor in the location of FDI on the basis of the investors surveyed. However, 
the "widely held assumption that Western investors do not care much about incentives" 
remains valid as it reflects the opinions and experiences of large multinationals which 
account for the vast majority of international investors in terms of the amount of their 
investment, but a tiny minority in terms of their number. 
     47 In Easson, Alex J., "Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment -- Part II: 
Recent Trends and Countertrends", 55 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 
12 (2001), at 367, the author argued that round-tripping may happen whenever tax 
incentives are given only to foreign investors. 
     48 China Daily, "Investment outflows to tax havens", People's Daily Online, 22 
June 2004, available at 
english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/22/eng20040622_147138.html  (visited on 31 July 
2007). 




figures reveals a large amount of capital going out of the country 
and returning under a different guise. The World Bank and other 
experts have estimated the scale of this round-tripping could be as 
large as 20% to 30% of the total FDI inflow into China, but there is 
no clear definition and detailed estimation method behind the 
numbers. ... Even worse is that the trend is growing bigger. ... The 
biggest pay-off for recycling mainland-originated money through a 
web of companies offshore is the tax concessions that China grants 
to foreign firms. 
 
Round-tripping is clearly not the type of investment to be encouraged by 
the tax incentives. Furthermore, the form of tax incentives (tax holidays) 
tends to encourage short-term investment projects. To the extent that tax 
incentives affected investment decisions, they encouraged investors to 
terminate a project as soon as the tax holiday was over and start a new 
project to qualify for a new tax holiday. 
 
In lieu of FDI-specific tax incentives, China hopes to better attract FDI by 
offering lower tax rates than other countries. The 25% general tax rate was 
chosen because it was internationally competitive. The Minister of 
Finance stated:49 
 
[T]he level of enterprise income tax rates in the world, especially 
the neighboring countries (regions), has to be taken into account. 
The average enterprise income tax rate is 28.6 percent in 159 
countries (regions) around the world in which an enterprise income 
tax is applied, while that in China's 18 neighboring countries 
(regions) is 26.7 percent. The rate of 25 percent set in the Draft is 
relatively low in the world and will be conducive to enhancing 
enterprise competitiveness and attracting foreign investment. 
 
C. INTERNATIONAL TAX NORMS AND PRACTICES 
 
As mentioned earlier, the enterprise income tax system came into 
existence with the promulgation of the EJVIT (1980) and FEIT (1981) 
                                                 
     49 Jin, supra note 33.  
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Laws, both of which incorporated elements of the international tax norms. 
In the interest of attracting FDI through tax policy and recognizing the 
increasing globalization of China's economy, the drafters of the EIT Law 
intended to move China's enterprise income tax system closer to the 
international norms. 
 
The basic structure of the EIT Law is based on the FIE Income Tax Law, 
which incorporated many concepts and principles of corporate taxation 
used in other countries. Adopting a uniform rate for all enterprises and 
using tax incentives to encourage small business, research and 
development, and other activities are consistent with the international tax 
norms. For the first time, Chinese tax law has adopted a controlled foreign 
corporations (CFC) rule, thin capitalization rules, and a statutory general 
anti-avoidance rule. 
 
D. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY AND SIMPLICITY IN COMPLIANCE 
 
The dual-track system was very complex to administer. Two separate 
administrative regimes were required. Because the FIE Income Tax Law 
was "international" and the Interim EIT Regulations were "domestic", tax 
administrators virtually used different languages. The Chinese and foreign 
partners of a joint venture had to work with two separate laws: the Interim 
EIT Regulations for the Chinese partner and the FIE Income Tax Law for 
the foreign partner. When a Chinese company was acquired by a foreign 
investor, its tax status was transformed, and so was the system of tax 
compliance. 
 
Furthermore, the FDI-specific tax incentives were known to be misused 
and abused by taxpayers.50 The above-mentioned round-tripping is just 
one example. The tax incentive legislation gave a great deal of discretion 
                                                 
     50 See Li, Tingxu, "Means of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion by Foreign 
Investment Enterprises and Prevention Measures", [1999] International Tax Journal of 
China, No. 8 at 62 (in Chinese); Tie, Wei, "Causes and Assessment of Tax Avoidance 
under Current Tax System", [2005] International Taxation in China, No. 11 at 32 (in 
Chinese); and Ye, Jun, "To Repeal or Not to Repeal the Foreign Tax Incentive Policies", 
[2005] International Tax Journal of China, No. 11 at 28 (in Chinese). 




to the tax authorities to approve the tax incentives.51 The lack of 
transparency and accountability in administering the tax incentive 
legislation tended to lead to graft, corruption and rent-seeking.52 Local 
governments engaged in fierce tax competition by lobbying the central 
government for more tax preferences and offering tax incentives.53 
 
The principle of making a tax payment easier and reducing the cost for 
both taxpayers and tax administrators has always been important in China. 
The lack of any history with a modern income tax system in China meant 
that the fate of the modern tax system was largely determined by the 
effectiveness of the administration and its efficiency. As such, this 
principle was paramount in China. About half of the articles in the EJVIT 
Law were devoted to administrative matters. In the new EIT Law, eight 
out of 60 articles are administrative provisions. In addition, more rules are 
prescribed in the Tax Collection and Administration Law. As compared 
with its predecessors, the EIT Law is more transparent in terms of 
taxpayers' obligations and the tax authorities' powers. 
 




The EIT Law is a landmark piece of legislation in Chinese tax history. It 
                                                 
     51 For example, Art. 8 of the FIE Income Tax Law states: "Any enterprise with 
foreign investment which is engaged in agriculture, forestry or animal husbandry and any 
other enterprise with foreign investment which is established in remote underdeveloped 
areas may, upon approval by the competent department for tax affairs under the State 
Council of an application filed by the enterprise, be allowed a 15% to 30% reduction of 
the amount of income tax payable for a period of 10 years ...." 
     52 See Wei, S., Does Corruption Relieve Foreign Investors of the Burden of Taxes 
and Capital Controls?, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2209 (1999); and 
Drabek, Zdenek and Warren Payne, The Impact of Transparency on Foreign Direct 
Investment, World Trade Organization, Staff Working Paper ERAD-99-02 (2001).   
     53 See Li and Chen, supra note 41; and Liang, Jiang, "China's Current Tax 
Preferences of High-Tech and the Problems", [2001] Taxation Research Journal, No. 10 
at 35 (in Chinese). 
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not only unifies the FIE Income Tax Law and the Interim EIT Regulations, 
but also introduces new concepts and provisions. The Minister of Finance 
highlighted "four unifications": unification of the income tax law 
applicable to both domestic and foreign-funded enterprises, unification of 
the tax rates, unification and standardization of the deductions in 
computing taxable income, and unification of the tax incentives.54 Most of 
the new provisions deal with international tax avoidance transactions, such 
as thin capitalization, transfer pricing, and foreign corporations located in 
low-tax jurisdictions. 
 
Consistent with China's legislative practice, most details for implementing 
the EIT Law will be spelled out in the implementation regulations to be 
promulgated by the State Council. At the time of writing (30 September 
2007), these regulations have not been released. Because the EIT Law will 
take effect on 1 January 2008, the lack of such detailed rules leaves many 
taxpayers and their tax advisers in a state of uncertainty. The discussion 
below is based on the text of the EIT Law. 
 
B. LIABILITY TO TAX 
 
Enterprises are subject to tax under the EIT Law. Resident enterprises are 
subject to tax on their income from inside and outside China; non-resident 
enterprises are subject to tax only on their Chinese-source income. 
 
The concept of "enterprise" is not defined. It is "one of the most 
perplexing aspects of Chinese enterprise law".55 An entity that is created 
under the authority of a statute is clearly an "enterprise" whose existence 
is distinct from the natural or legal persons who participate in its 
operations. In some cases, government institutions give real and 
meaningful effect to the existence of entities with no apparent statutory 
basis or whose legal basis dictates consequences that seem at odds with 
                                                 
     54 Jin, supra note 33. 
     55 Clarke, Donald C., "How Do We Know When an Enterprise Exists? 
Unanswerable Questions and Legal Polycentricity in China", 19 Columbia Journal of 
Asian Law 50 (2005). 




the consequences called for by a constitutionally superior law.56 The 
uncertainty is more prevalent for domestically-funded entities because the 
legal regime for FDI is more standard and transparent. Taxpayers under 
the FIE Income Tax Law are "enterprises" under the EIT Law. 
 
The term "resident" is defined as any legal person that is created under 
Chinese law or has its effective management in China. A "legal person" 
can be a Chinese-owned corporation57 or enterprise or an FIE. A legal 
entity created under Chinese law is a resident by virtue of the place of 
creation. A corporation created under foreign law is generally a non-
resident of China, unless its place of effective management is in China. 
China's tax treaties define "resident" in a manner similar to the definition 
in Art. 4 of the OECD Model. A resident is a person liable to tax under the 
laws of a contracting state by reason of domicile, residence, place of head 
office, place of management, or any other criterion of a similar nature. If a 
legal person has dual residence, the place of effective management is 
typically the tie-breaker. 
 
Non-resident enterprises are not taxable in China unless they derive 
Chinese-source income. Foreign corporations carrying on business 
operations in the form of a branch or through a partnership are subject to 
Chinese tax on the profit derived from the activities in China.58 Business 
income is taxable in China if the business is carried on through an 
establishment or site in China. An "establishment" typically refers to a 
management office, business site, office, factory, place of extraction of 
natural resources, site for contracted projects (such as construction, 
installation, assembly or exploration projects), site for furnishing services, 
and a business agent (EIT Law, Art. 3). The concept is tied to the physical 
presence of a foreign enterprise or its business agent in China. China's tax 
                                                 
     56 Id. 
     57 Company Law of the People's Republic of China, Act of 19 December 1993. 
     58 Foreign corporations are allowed to carry on business activities in China in the 
form of a branch (Company Law, id., Art. 119). They can also establish a representative 
office but only if a Chinese enterprise sponsors it, and the activities of a representative 
office are limited to indirect business operations, marketing, promotion, equipment 
service and business communications. See Art. 4 of the Interim Regulations of the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Control of Resident 
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises, Act of 30 October 1980. 
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treaties generally permit China to tax the business profits of an enterprise 
in a treaty partner's country only if the profits are derived from a business 
carried on through a permanent establishment in China. 
 
Portfolio investment in China remains limited.59 In 2005, while the FDI 
inflow was valued at over USD 603 billion, Chinese companies issued 
USD 1.6 billion worth of shares overseas and entered into international 
leasing transactions worth USD 1.08 billion.60 Technology transfers are 
generally associated with FDI; FIEs imported more than half of the foreign 
technology imported into China.61 Non-residents deriving dividends, 
interest, rents and royalties from Chinese sources are subject to a 20% 
withholding tax. China's tax treaties often reduce the rate to 10% or lower. 
Capital gains derived by non-residents are taxable in China if the gains are 
realized from the sale of buildings, structures and affiliated facilities, land-
use rights in China, or other property situated in China. 
 
C. TAXABLE INCOME 
 
The determination of taxable income is generally the same as under the 
FIE Income Tax Law. The details for the determination will be prescribed 
in the forthcoming implementation regulations. In principle, a taxpayer's 
taxable income is the amount of gross income62 reduced by deducting 
excluded income,63 exempt income, costs and expenses, and loss carry-
                                                 
     59 Deriving portfolio income in China through a Chinese resident corporation is not 
yet common. Chinese regulations generally require FIEs to be engaged in business 
activities. Investment holding companies are allowed to hold investments only in the 
same corporate group. 
     60 China Statistical Yearbook, available at 
www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexch.htm. 
     61 Ministry of Commerce, available at 
zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200707/20070704841184.html (visited on 12 
July 2007). 
     62 "Gross income" is defined as "an enterprise's monetary and non-monetary 
income from various sources" (EIT Law, Art. 6). 
     63 "Excluded income" is defined as income from fiscal funds such as fiscal 
appropriations, administrative charges subject to fiscal administration, and government 
funds (EIT Law, Art. 7). 




forwards (EIT Law, Art. 5). 
 
Under the existing law, domestic enterprises and foreign-funded 
enterprises are subject to different rules for deducting costs and expenses. 
For example, domestic enterprises may deduct a limited amount of the 
salaries and wages paid, while FIEs may deduct the actual amount paid. 
The EIT Law unifies the deduction rules, allowing enterprises to deduct 
the costs and expenses actually incurred. The EIT Law prescribes the 
standards for deducting expenses only in the case of public welfare 
donations (EIT Law, Art. 9) and defines the scope of non-deductible 
expenses (EIT Law, Art. 10). Surprisingly, the loss carry-over is still 
limited to a five-year carry-forward; no carry-back is allowed. 
 
D. TAX RATES 
 
Art. 4 of the EIT Law unifies the rates.64 The general rate is 25%, which is 
much lower than the effective rate currently applicable to domestic 
enterprises, but higher than that for FIEs.65 The 25% was considered to be 
internationally competitive,66 although it is twice as high as that in Ireland 
and Hong Kong. 
 
A lower rate of 20% applies to small and low-profit enterprises. The 
lowest rate of 15% applies to new and high-tech enterprises that are 
supported by the state as key enterprises. The Minister of Finance 
explained that the lower rates for high-tech enterprises and small and low-
profit enterprises are justified because they play a special role in the 
national economy and, according to international practice, these types of 
                                                 
     64 Under the existing law, the standard statutory tax rate is 33%. The rate is 
lowered to 24% or 15% for FIEs in some special regions and to 27% or 18% for low-
profit domestic enterprises. There is a large disparity between the statutory tax rate and 
effective tax rate as a result of various tax incentives. 
     65 The estimated amount of the tax reduction for domestic enterprises was CNY 
134 billion and the tax increase for FIEs was CNY 41 billion, resulting in an overall 
revenue loss of CNY 93 billion. The revenue decrease was considered acceptable to the 
government; see Jin, supra note 33.  
     66 Jin, id. See the statement of Minister of Finance Jin regarding the tax rates 
(quoted in the text at note 49, supra). 
  
22                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 03 NO. 06 
 
enterprises receive support from the government in other countries.67 It is 
expected that a significant number of FIEs will qualify for the lower rates. 
 
Local governments may waive or reduce a portion of the tax that belongs 
to the local government under the central-local fiscal arrangement. 
 
E. TAX INCENTIVES 
 
The new EIT Law abolishes most of the tax incentives discussed earlier. 
Instead of targeting FDI, the new tax incentives encourage designated 
activities or types of income in order to promote overall, sustainable 
economic growth. Tax-preferred investments and activities include those 
in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, public infrastructure, 
environmental protection, conservation of energy and water resources, 
research and development, and transfers of technology (EIT Law, Art. 27). 
 
The forms of tax incentives are more flexible. In addition to the traditional 
tax rate reductions, the EIT Law provides the following forms: 
 
(a) accelerated deductions for expenditures for research and 
development, for fixed assets, and to create jobs for the disabled (EIT 
Law, Art. 30); 
 
(b) additional deductions for a proportion of the capital contributions 
to qualified venture capital enterprises (EIT Law, Art. 31); 
 
(c) exemption of income from the comprehensive utilization of 
resources or manufacturing of products that are consistent with the state's 
industrial policies (EIT Law, Art. 34); 
(d) exemption of interest on state bonds, dividends received from 
resident corporations, dividends received by non-resident enterprises from 
resident enterprises, and income of non-profit enterprises (EIT Law, Art. 
26); 
 
(e) investment credit for investment in equipment used for 
                                                 
     67 Jin, supra note 33. 




environmental protection, conservation of energy or water, or production 
safety (EIT Law, Art. 31). Additional incentives may be granted to 
enterprises in key industries or projects that are supported and encouraged 
by the state (EIT Law, Art. 25); and 
 
(f) special relief authorized by the State Council for emergencies that 
have a major impact on regular business activities (EIT Law, Art. 36). 
 
It was feared that eliminating the existing tax incentives and increasing the 
general tax rate for FIEs could potentially discourage FDI in China. To 
ease this fear, Art. 57 of the EIT Law allows existing FIEs to continue to 
pay tax at the lower rate of 15% or 24% until 2013 or to enjoy other types 
of tax incentives (such as tax holidays) until the specified time period is 
over. For existing FIEs that have not started enjoying the tax holidays 
because they have not yet made a profit, the tax holiday will start in 2008 
and end in 2013. 
 
Overall, there is some continuity in China's tax incentive policy. High-tech 
businesses continue to receive tax incentives in the form of a lower tax 
rate (15%) as well as accelerated deductions for research and 
development. The preferential tax policy continues to apply to investments 
in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries and infrastructure 
construction. State-encouraged projects (such as those in Pudong and the 
western regions) continue to qualify for tax incentives. The abolished tax 
incentives include the tax rate reductions for FIEs in special areas and the 
incentives for export-oriented FIEs. 
4.6. Foreign tax credit 
 
The foreign-source income derived by resident enterprises is taxable under 
the EIT Law, subject to a foreign tax credit for the foreign income tax paid 
on the foreign income (EIT Law, Art. 23). More specifically, the foreign 
tax credit system operates on a worldwide basis. There is no distinction 
between business income and passive income in determining the limit on 
the foreign tax credit. Any excess credit may be carried forward for five 
years, but not refunded. 
 
For the first time, China allows an indirect foreign tax credit: a credit may 
be claimed for any foreign corporate income tax attributable to the 
dividends received by a Chinese corporate shareholder from a non-resident 
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corporation that is controlled directly or indirectly by a Chinese resident 
(EIT Law, Art. 24). 
 
F. ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES 
 
The EIT Law contains the typical anti-avoidance rules found in other 
countries. The Minister of Finance explained the need for such rules as 
follows:68 
 
Tax avoidance by some enterprises through various means is 
serious, and the struggle against tax avoidance is intense. Thus, on 
the basis of international practice, the Draft provides rules for 
preventing tax avoidance through transfer pricing among 
associated enterprises. It also provides general anti-avoidance rules 
and articles against thin capitalization and avoidance through tax 
havens. Moreover, it sets forth provisions for assessment 
procedures and collection of interest from settling tax arrears as 
provided for by the State Council. This will help guard against and 
prevent tax avoidance and safeguard the interests of the state. 
 
1. TRANSFER PRICING 
 
The EIT Law provides the following rules to address transfer pricing, 
which is recognized as a serious problem in China:69 
                                                 
     68 Id. 
     69 Even with generally lower tax rates and generous tax incentives, multinational 
corporations apparently use transfer pricing techniques to shift profits away from China. 
This may appear to be surprising. But a closer look at the top source jurisdictions for the 
FDI inflow to China reveals the motivation for some investors. Hong Kong does not tax 
income derived from outside Hong Kong. Hence, savings in Chinese tax directly benefit 
the investors. Barbados, the British Virgin Islands, the Caymen Islands, etc., are well-
known tax havens. Deflecting profits away from China to these jurisdictions reduces the 
foreign investor's worldwide tax burden. In the past, Chinese tax law had a built-in 
incentive for foreign investors to indefinitely prolong the loss period in that the tax 
holidays started to run continuously from the first year of making a profit. Approximately 
60% to 70% of FIEs reported tax losses. For further discussion, see Sherwood, Stanley G. 
and Peter G. Chen, "China's Transfer Pricing Wall", [2002] Tax Planning International 






Where business transactions between an enterprise and its 
associated enterprises are not based on the arm's length principle, 
resulting in the reduction of the taxable income of the enterprise or 
its associated enterprise, the tax authority has the power to make 
adjustments based on any reasonable methods. 
 
Costs associated with joint development, transfer of intangible 
assets, or joint provision or receipt of services by an enterprise and 
its associated enterprises should be allocated on the basis of the 




An enterprise may provide the tax authority with the 
pricing principles and computation methods in respect of its 
related party transactions. After negotiations and 
verifications with the enterprise, the tax authority may enter 
into an advance pricing arrangement with the enterprise. 
 
Article 43: 
When an enterprise files an annual enterprise income tax 
return with the tax authority, it must also enclose an annual 
report on its transactions with its associated enterprises. 
 
When the tax authority conducts its investigation of related party 
transactions, the enterprise, its associated enterprise, and any other 
enterprise that is relevant to the investigation must provide the 
relevant materials in accordance with the regulations. 
 
Article 44: 
When an enterprise fails to provide materials relevant to the related 
party transactions, or provides false or incomplete information that 
                                                                                                                         
Transfer Pricing, No. 2 at 9, 10; Li, Jinyan, Chapter China, in The Tax Treatment of 
Transfer Pricing (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, loose-leaf); and Wu, Xiupo, "Reasons 
for Transfer Pricing in China", [2001] International Taxation in China, No. 2 at 30 (in 
Chinese).  
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cannot truly reflect the reality of related party transactions, the tax 
authority is authorized to assess the enterprise's taxable income in 
accordance with the law and regulations. 
 
These provisions incorporate the existing transfer pricing rules,70 which 
generally follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. For the first time, 
however, the EIT Law addresses cost-sharing arrangements (see Art. 
41(2)) and advance pricing arrangements (APAs) in the tax law (as 
opposed to administrative guidelines). These developments are welcome 
to multinational enterprises that would like to use these arrangements in 
China. In the past, multinational companies were less willing to share 
intellectual property or services with their Chinese subsidiaries for various 
reasons, a key factor being that shared costs were not deductible for the 
Chinese subsidiaries. Art. 41 now removes the tax obstacle by providing a 
legal framework which may pave the way for China to attract more 
advanced intangible property and sophisticated services from overseas. 
 
Art. 42 recognizes the importance of APAs. The State Administration of 
Taxation has developed an APA programme, and some bilateral APAs 
have been concluded, involving Japan, South Korea and the United States. 
 
Art. 48 of the EIT Law provides that an additional interest levy will be 
imposed on the amount of adjustments made to transfer pricing 
transactions. The levy is in addition to the normal tax arising from the 
adjustment. This levy could be considered the "real teeth" of China's 
transfer pricing regime. To date, there is no penalty for any transfer 
pricing adjustments made by the authorities, except for the tax on the 
adjustment itself. This reduces the incentive for taxpayers to comply until 
they face a transfer pricing review or audit. The additional interest levy 
may include a true interest component based on the time value of money 
and a penalty component. In particular, a retrospective interest charge may 
have a significant impact given that the tax authorities can investigate as 
                                                 
     70 The most comprehensive set of guidelines is the "Tax Administration Rules and 
Procedures for Transactions between Associated Enterprises (Trial)", [1998] Guo Shui 
Fa, No. 59. This circular consists of 52 articles organized in 12 chapters. China's transfer 
pricing rules generally follow the international concepts and the arm's length principle 
expounded in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, although neither the FEIT Law nor 
the 1998 transfer pricing circular specifically refers to the OECD Guidelines. 




far back as ten years. The EIT Law does not state whether the imposition 
of the additional interest levy will be retrospective or prospective or the 
rate of interest and methodology to be applied. 
 
2. THIN CAPITALIZATION 
 
The thin capitalization rule is found in Art. 46 of the EIT Law: 
 
Interest accrued to the portion of debt exceeding the specified ratio 
of debt and equity investment received from an associated 
enterprise is not deductible in computing taxable income. 
 
According to Art. 46, if the debt/equity ratio exceeds a specified level, the 
excess interest cannot be deducted in computing taxable income. This is 
the first thin capitalization rule in China. It applies to loans from related 
parties only. Key concepts, such as "debt", "equity", "related party" and 
"back-to-back loans", are expected to be defined in the forthcoming 
implementation regulations. 
 
3. CFC RULE 
 
Taxpayers can defer the Chinese tax on foreign-source income through the 
use of foreign corporations, typically located in a no-tax or low-tax 
jurisdiction. For the first time, the tax law provides a rudimentary anti-
deferral rule in Art. 45 of the EIT Law: 
 
Where an enterprise that is established by a Chinese resident 
enterprise in a jurisdiction pays tax at a rate obviously lower than 
25% and does not distribute its profits for reasons other than 
business needs, the amount of profit that should have been 
distributed to the Chinese shareholder is included in the income of 
the Chinese resident. 
 
Unlike the anti-deferral rules of other countries (such as the US Subpart F 
rules or the Canadian foreign accrual property income (FAPI) rules), Art. 
45 of the EIT Law does not distinguish between foreign portfolio income 
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and business income. Instead, it uses the "jurisdiction" approach by 
applying the CFC rule to the total income of a CFC in a low-tax 
jurisdiction (i.e. a jurisdiction whose tax rate is lower than the rate under 
the EIT Law). In addition, Art. 45 has a "business reason/purpose" test -- 
that is, the income that is retained by the CFC and not distributed to the 
Chinese shareholders for business reasons is not subject to the imputed 
dividend rule. 
 
The target of imputed dividend taxation in Art. 45 is apparently the use of 
tax havens by Chinese enterprises to keep funds away from China. It is 
unclear whether making a portfolio investment outside China meets the 
"business reason" test. It is also unclear how the State Administration of 
Taxation plans to obtain information on offshore investments. Because 
this rule applies only to enterprises, wealthy individuals are not affected 
by it. 
 
4. GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE 
 
Art. 47 of the EIT Law provides: 
 
Where an enterprise enters into an arrangement that has no 
reasonable commercial purpose, thereby reducing its taxable 
revenue or income, the tax authority has the power to make 
adjustments based on reasonable methods. 
 
This rule formally authorizes the Chinese tax authorities to make an 
adjustment if the taxpayer enters into an arrangement without a 
"reasonable commercial purpose". This is a strong signal of the tax 
authorities' growing scrutiny of anti-avoidance schemes. Presumably, this 
rule applies when a transactions avoids the application of specific anti-
avoidance rules. Art. 48 further provides: 
 
Where the tax authority has made adjustments in accordance with 
the above rules in this Chapter, the enterprise must pay the tax 
arrears as well as a special interest levy imposed under regulations 
promulgated by the State Council. 
 






The promulgation of the EIT Law is perceived to reflect "a growing 
confidence in China's global standing, not only for lower cost 
manufacturing, but as a consumer market with its own draw".71 Investors 
and capital markets in China appear to welcome the new tax law as they 
expect the large domestic companies -- the major banks, telecoms 
companies, and oil and gas producers -- that dominate the indexes of 
Chinese stock will see their after-tax earnings boosted by the tax 
changes.72 Foreign investors looking for a more transparent and neutral tax 
policy as part of the investment environment welcome the changes. 
Similarly, established FIEs that have used up their tax holidays or are 
engaged in activities that are tax-favoured under the new law (such as 
research and development, infrastructure projects, and environmental 
industries) stand to benefit under the new law.73 More importantly, foreign 
manufacturers are making products for sale in China, seizing on its fast-
growing consumer market. The biggest concern thus far is the lack of 
details for implementing the EIT Law. It is problematic that, at the time of 




                                                 
     71 Leander, Tom, "The big changes in China's tax code reflect a shift in economic 
priorities. But much about the law remains a mystery", CFO Asia (May 2007), available 
at www.cfoasia.com/archives/200705-10.htm. The 2007 tax reform has been perceived to 
represent China's commitment to the WTO, which can only strengthen China's attraction 
to foreign investment. The tax increase for FIEs "will not crush out the zest of foreign 
investment" because "what weighs in their decision is China's huge market potential". 
Thus far, the negative reaction to the new law is based mostly on the lack of detailed 
rules and regulations to implement it. 
     72 Baston, Andrew, "China's Expected New Tax Law would Even the Playing 
Field", The Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2007, at C9. 
     73 According to Leander, supra note 71, some multinationals have adapted their 
business plans to the policy changes. GE (General Electric) China has announced that it 
will invest USD 50 million in its Shanghai-based technology centre for products serving 
environmental protection, including more efficient airplane engines and wind power 
generators, seawater desalination technology, and energy-saving bulbs. 
